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Abstract
This paper assesses how financial regulation, in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), affects
industrial innovation. We describe the decision faced by an investor considering an innovative project
before, at the time of, and subsequent to SOX. SOX is shown to create a real option value for investment
delay through its short term hike and medium term diminution in uncertainty, and we calculate how
implementation parameters impact on delay and subsequent innovation. To test our model’s impli-
cations, we examine patenting in stem cell technologies from 2001 to 2009, introducing two methods
of endogenously detecting changes in patenting rates. We find a post-SOX dip in patenting consistent
with our model, and no long term effect on innovation. We reject US government funding cuts to hu-
man embryonic stem cell research as a cause of the observed behaviour, as well as five other sets of
explanations.
1 Introduction
The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002, hereafter SOX) was a regulatory re-
sponse to financial scandals in the early 2000s. It imposed new disclosure requirements
on companies, placed increased restrictions on the behaviour and conflicts of interests for
company insiders, and specified new penalties for related malfeasance. Auditors and se-
curities analysts were also subject to more stringent regulations on their behaviour, and a
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new not-for-profit company, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),
was established to oversee auditors and audit quality.
Many regulatory demands of SOX could incur costs for companies. The PCAOB, for
instance, is funded by company levies, and the increased demands on auditor quality could
be passed on as greater charges for audit. The net effect of SOX on available company
funds is not apparent as the Act may increase investor confidence in investment at the
same time as increasing the effective charges levied against that investment. Neither is it
clear what the change will be in incentives for particular managerial uses of the available
funds. For example, activities that are more heavily regulated in the new rules may be
relatively less profitable relative to other activities after SOX.
Given these uncertain effects on company funding and incentives, the literature has
examined the association between the passage of SOX and contemporaneous changes in
a variety of financial and non-financial corporate variables. They include market return
(Li et al., 2008; Zhang, 2007), equity cost (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009), investment dis-
count factors (Kang et al., 2010), cross-listing premium (Litvak, 2007), company cost and
structure (Linck et al., 2009), market entry choices (Engel et al., 2007; Leuz et al., 2008),
profitability (Ahmed et al., 2010), investment efficiency (Cheng et al., 2013), and research
and development spending (Bargeron et al., 2010). Some research has examined changes in
variables indicating mechanisms by which SOX may affect the market, including executive
incentives (Cohen et al., 2013), costs (Millar and Bowen, 2011), informational asymmetry
(Akhigbe et al., 2010), informational content of earnings (Singer and You, 2011; Kalelkar
and Nwaeze, 2011), and investment risk (Akhigbe et al., 2008; Akhigbe and Martin, 2008).
This paper examines whether SOX was associated with a change in industrial innova-
tion by affected companies. SOX may have altered their available funding for research
and development or managerial preferences for such risky activities as found by Bargeron
et al. (2010) and Cohen et al. (2013). Innovation represents an investment in intellectual
property made in anticipation of a stream of future income from its commercialisation,
and the decision to invest depends on revenues taking into account SOX’s effects on costs
and risk.
We formulate the dynamic problem faced by an investor considering investment in
an innovative company. Managerial quality is unknown, which introduces uncertainty in
returns. Prior to SOX, the investor’s problem is time symmetric and there is no benefit
from waiting. When SOX is initially introduced, additional uncertainty is introduced linked
to SOX’s costs. The uncertainty about SOX’s costs and managerial quality declines over
time, and the investor is incentivised to delay investment both by the real option value of
waiting and the decline in the managerial quality risk premium. In the long run, SOX’s
effect on investment depends on the relative sizes of SOX costs and the risk premium. We
test for innovation’s temporary fall after SOX’s introduction, and infer SOX’s net effects
independent of temporary uncertainty effects by comparison of long run innovation with
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pre-SOX innovation.
Our testing and inference is on the time series of patent rates in stem cell technologies.
Our reasons for selecting stem cell technologies is fourfold. The biotech industry has itself
raised concerns about the effects of SOX (Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2006).
The stem cell technology industry is new, small, and risky. These characteristics have
often been found to be linked to magnification of SOX’s effects on funding and incentives
(Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Engel et al., 2007; Jain et al., 2008; Kamar et al.,
2007; Kang et al., 2010; Li et al., 2008; Litvak, 2007; Wintoki, 2007). It is an industry
that is of particular social prominence and potential. Finally, selection of a single industry
for examination gives data amenable to our estimation techniques, which are univariate in
order to facilitate flexible, endogenous break date estimation.
SOX’s effect can be identified by comparing quantities of interest in base periods as-
sumed to have been influenced by SOX with their value in control periods assumed to
be free of influence. Existing literature differs in the length and timing of the base and
control periods. Event studies such as Li et al. (2008) and Zhang (2007) take short base
periods associated with plausibly significant SOX-related occurrences and announcements,
and usually extended control periods around the base periods. Doidge et al. (2009) use a
long control and base period with a single cut-off point at the end of 2001 (as well as a
more flexible sequence of annual cross sectional regressions), Cohen et al. (2013) use the
same cut-off point, while Ahmed et al. (2010) have a control period ending in 2002 and a
base period starting in 2004. Engel et al. (2007) use both short and long base periods to
classify times by SOX’s impact. These periods are generally ultimately set according to
the researchers’ judgement.
It is not clear which dates to include in each period in view of SOX’s decade long
planning, passage, implementation, delay, and revision (Gao et al., 2009; Biotechnology
Industry Organization, 2012). The theoretical case for including, say, the date on which
a senator issued a statement of regulatory intent, may be uncertain. Further, the effect
may spill beyond the period hypothesised, or it may be delayed, or it may be a temporary
reaction that is subsequently corrected. Alternative date classifications can lead to different
conclusions. These classification problems are particularly severe for short periods. Whilst
longer periods mitigate the difficulty, they are more likely to have influential non-SOX
events within them, leading to problems in ascribing any changes to SOX.
Our approach to the classification problem is to use the data to estimate change dates
in the number of US residents’ patent applications over the period 2001 to 2009. Our first
procedure estimates an autoregressive negative binomial count process in the presence of a
structural change in trend and level where the change date varies across the whole period,
leading to a series of change p-values. We examine the p-values to identify the absolute
and relative importance of any break that occurred around the time of SOX. We use direct
comparison of the p-values in the eighteen month period from July 2002 to December 2003
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to identify the date at which a break was most likely. The coefficient estimates at that date
are reported, as are Monte Carlo simulated p-values for the break coefficients. These values
correct for the conditionality introduced in the raw p-values by the search procedure, and
for the bias induced by small sample maximum likelihood estimation.
Our second procedure allows for multiple breaks and multiple patenting states. To
identify them, we assume a constant probability of transition between Poisson states, with
possibility of re-entry to previously exited states. The resulting hidden Markov model is
estimated to give the most likely series of states over the whole period, and the coefficient
estimates within each state. The estimation is performed for two and three distinct states.
The p-value testing finds that structural change occurred with higher probability around
the time of SOX than elsewhere in the period. A trend change in patenting was most likely
around July 2002, while a level shift was most likely around July 2003. In the two state
hidden Markov model, a pre-SOX change is identified where patenting starts to increase
from a very low level. The three state hidden Markov model identifies another change
in July 2003, when the rate of patenting declines. Consistent with the earlier theoretical
predictions following from the modelling assumptions, the rate corrects after two years to
its previous process.
The timing of the patenting process break is consistent with other feasible non-SOX ex-
planations. They include shocks to the patenting process that affect US and non-US paten-
ters equally (unlike SOX), shocks that affect institutional and non-institutional patenters
equally (unlike SOX), an exhaustion of the technological prospects of US patenters, a re-
cent industry downturn that had driven many US innovators out of the market, reduction
in US government funding for stem cell research, and shocks that affect only stem cell in-
novation (unlike SOX). We consider their plausibility and some empirical hypotheses that
are closely related to them. Evidence is presented against them as exclusive explanations
for the observed break.
Our work is related to a number of research strands in the literature. It contributes
to the analysis of how financial changes affect industrial outcomes. The impact of finance
on innovation is well recognised Hall (2002), and there have been some studies of how
changes brought by financial crises affect innovation (Paunov, 2012; Archibugi et al., 2013).
Bargeron et al. (2010) look at how SOX affected R&D. However, this study is the first we
are aware of that looks at how innovative outputs are affected by financial regulation and
specifically SOX.
For the general SOX literature, we believe that this paper represents the first real
options representation of investment decisions after the Act. It indicates that the common
examination in the financial literature of SOX effects over a period of several years is likely
to be misleading because of uncertainty and risk option effects. We believe we are the first
to employ hidden Markov models as an econometric method able to disclose corrections
in post-SOX outcomes, and the first to endogenise break dates, through HMMs and the
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introduction of a robust time-varying break methodology.
Section 2 looks at our theoretical framework, section 3 describes our data, the empirical
method is described in 4, results are presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section we describe the options faced by an investor who can invest in an project
leading to innovation. Their investment criteria are given prior to SOX, immediately
following its introduction, and in the long run. After solving the criteria, we use them to
formulate a testable hypothesis and a means of inferring SOX’s persistent effect.
An investor is profit maximising and earns income from investing in a company and
receiving profits from their investment. They discount future income at a rate d. The
investor is risk averse and incurs costs of KR when they receive a random income drawn
from distribution function R; this cost may arise from extra capital being advanced to
protect against loss exposure and so not being available for higher yielding projects else-
where. When R is concentrated at a single point, KR = 0. Investors have funds available
for immediate investment in the company, or can choose to delay for m time periods and
then reassess their options.
The company requires investment of C. If the company receives the investment, it is
spent on an innovative project that is non-reversible and there are no resale opportunities
at a value above the investment return. Innovation results in intellectual property and a
one-off income from it of rt. Because of difficulties in observing the company’s managerial
quality, the investor perceives rt as unknown prior to investment and treats it as a random
variable drawn from a distribution Rt. The company protects its intellectual property by
patenting, with the number of patents increasing in rt.
Prior to SOX, the distribution Rt is unchanging over time, so R0= Rm. When SOX is
introduced, the income generated after investment decreases by a one-off cost of st. We call
this extra term “cost” by reference to the additional auditing and other expenses incurred
through SOX, but it may be negative and so increase the investor’s income if the changes
improve the ongoing performance of the company. Investors are initially unsure about the
size of st, and treat it as drawn from a distribution St. They have assumptions about how
they will update their prior distribution of the effect as information emerges over time.
Companies anticipate that they will have sufficient information to form stable judgements
of SOX’s effect by time m, so that the support for Sm will be a single point within the
support for S0. We denote by Qt the distribution of the sum qt = rt − st.
Before SOX’s introduction, the investor loses from delay in making their investment
decision or not. The distribution function of returns is stable over time, so the same
undiscounted expected return will be earned from immediate or delayed investment, and
the latter return is subject to discounting. So investment will be made if and only if the
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expected returns from immediate investment net of risk costs are positive, or∫
I(R0)
r dR0 −K(R0) > 0 (1)
where I(R0) is the support of R0.
Immediately after SOX’s introduction, the returns from investment change over time
so a choice not to invest immediately does not imply a permanent commitment. Thus,
investors choose whether to invest straightaway or delay for m periods until they are fully
informed about SOX costs and managerial quality. Delay occurs if and only if∫
I(Q0)
q dQ0 −K(Q0) < 1
(1 + d)m
∫
I(Q+)
q dQ0 (2)
where I(Q0) is the support of Q0 and I(Q+) = {q ∈ I(Q0) : q > 0}
The left hand side is the expected value from immediate investment, and the right
hand side is the expected value from waiting and only investing if the revealed managerial
quality net of costs gives a positive profit. We can decompose the integral on the left hand
side to give ∫
I(Q+)
q dQ0 +
∫
I(Q−)
q dQ0 −K(Q0) < 1
(1 + d)m
∫
I(Q+)
q dQ0 (3)
where I(Q−) = I(Q0) \ I(Q+), which is the set of SOX costs and managerial qualities
that result in a loss if they occur after m periods.
Thus, the criterion for delay is
1− 1
(1 + d)m
<
− ∫
I(Q−) q dQ0 + K(Q0)∫
I(Q+)
q dQ0
(4)
We term the right hand side minus the left hand side the value of delay; we could
alternatively introduce an error term into a stochastic investment decision criterion and
frame our next results in terms of investment probabilities. Inequality 4 can be used to
assess the impact on short run investment delay of features of SOX. For example, with
parameter values of m = 1 and d = 10%, the left hand side equals 0.09. The real option
value of waiting is so substantial that a potential loss from ignorance or a risk aversion
that are quite small relative to the potential profit from early investment will lead to delay.
If the expected costs of SOX increase, then the integral in the numerator rises and the
integral in the denominator falls. The right hand side becomes larger and the value of
delay increases. Intuitively, there is less to be gained from early commitment and more to
be lost.
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If the dispersion in the expected costs increases without altering the expected value,
then any extra expected profits will be exactly offset by extra losses and they will grow
monotonically with the dispersion (we recall that SOX costs may be positive or negative
if there are managerial improvements that follow from it). Thus, the absolute values of
the integrals in the numerator and denominator will increase and the value of the right
hand side of the inequality will tend to unity monotonically. If the starting value of the
numerator exceeds the starting value of the denominator then delay initially occurs. The
convergence is from above and since the left hand side of the expression is strictly less than
one, delay will continue to occur no matter how much dispersion there is. On the other
hand, if the starting value of the denominator exceeds the numerator it is possible that
the investor initially prefers to invest immediately, and the increased dispersion can lead
to delay as the value of the right hand side increases. Thus, increased dispersion can lead
to investment delays, which is reasonable as increased dispersion can reduce the relative
importance of expected gains from early investment (that is, increase the right hand side
ratio from below unity) and so make delay preferable.
As the speed of uncertainty reduction increases, then the parameter m reduces on the
left hand side of the inequality 4. The value of the left hand side falls, and delays are
more likely. The intuitive explanation is that if there are less discounting costs incurred by
waiting to see what the costs and managerial quality are, then the value of delay increases.
From the considerations on SOX costs, delay, and uncertainty reduction, we can infer
how SOX implementation might lead to delay. As SOX certainly introduced uncertainty
about its costs, with the promise of reduced uncertainty over time about them and about
the level of managerial quality, increased delays would be expected. The effect of net SOX
costs is ambiguous, as it is unclear whether they are positive or negative, although the
literature has reported net positive costs. On balance, we will test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. A temporary downward shift in innovative investment will occur after
SOX.
We can strengthen the hypothesis slightly. Hartman (2007) presents data from 2001 to
2006 on SOX related costs and companies’ self-reported ability to predict them. The survey
results show (pages 16-7) stabilisation of overall costs of operating as a public company
after 2004, for companies with annual revenue over and under $1 billion. The stabilisation
is attributed to offsetting internal efficiencies, as actual external payments such as audit
fees continue to increase (pages 2 and 19). They further show (page 14) a large increase
between 2004 and 2006 in companies agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement “. . . I
am better able to predict costs associated with corporate governance reforms”, from 38% to
65%. These results do not translate to an exact parameterisation for our model. However,
they indicate narrowing distributions close to a point or slow moving deterministic process
if the prediction process for future distributions has additional plausible assumptions,
such as more weight being given to recent observations than older ones, importance being
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assigned to small changes in recent costs, and increased confidence in prediction resulting
in diminishing importance of wide prior distributions. Thus, we may expect most learning
about SOX to happen over a period of a few years, so that the restoration of patenting
after SOX should happen on the same timescale.
After m periods, investors are aware of SOX’s costs and managerial quality and face no
further uncertainty. They therefore face a problem of investing if and only if
rm − sm > 0 (5)
where rm and sm are realisations from the returns distribution R0 and the SOX cost
distribution S0 respectively.
Comparing with the investment criterion before SOX given in inequality 1, we see that
the long run value of investment will increase if and only if
rm − sm >
∫
I(R0)
r dR0 −K(R0) (6)
which says that the observed returns net of the observed SOX costs exceed the expected
returns net of the risk premium. Generally the left hand side and right hand side will
differ in value, and SOX will induce a long term change in investment and innovation. At
the time of SOX’s implementation the two left hand values will not be known, and their
expected values can be taken to determine whether SOX is expected to increase investment.
Cancelling out the terms for expected returns and rearranging, we have
K(R0) >
∫
I(S0)
s dS0 (7)
where I(S0) is the support of S0.
So SOX is expected to increase investment if and only if the risk premium from ignorance
about managerial quality (which vanishes after SOX) exceeds the expected SOX costs
(which appear after SOX). If investors are not risk averse and SOX is expected to be
costly, then the left hand side will be zero and the right hand side will be positive, so the
value of investment will tend to fall after SOX.
With our available data, we will not be able to test these theoretical results in a formal
hypothesis. However, we will interpret changes in our analysed quantities as being due
to SOX, in line with the assumption in the literature and subject to exclusion of alter-
native causes. We differ from the literature in the timing of the comparison; rather than
comparing immediately after SOX, we compare only after any dip in patenting has been
corrected, as if our hypothesis is validated the initial period is characterised by adjustment
to uncertainty rather than persistent cost and benefits.
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3 Data
Our empirical analysis examines the patenting rates for innovation in the area of stem cell
technology. The stem cell technology industry is recently established, with only 22 issued
patents referring to stem cells in their title by the end of 1995 (USPTO, 2013), shortly
following the establishment of current industry leaders such as Geron, Osiris, and Viacord.
The industry remains relatively small, with Lysaght et al. (2008, Table 2) estimating
2007 commercial sales at $273 million, with average sales per operating company of $11
million. In the early 2000s, some of the industry’s leading stocks exhibited considerable
volatility (Salter, 2005). Investors at that time faced additional uncertainty relative to
the situation today, in that the science was at a preliminary stage, product sales were
negligible, and a number of the pioneering commercial enterprises in tissue engineering
such as Organogenesis and Advanced Tissue Sciences had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Investment, company numbers, and sales were all rapidly increasing and volatile (Salter,
2005, Table 3; Salter, 2005, Table 1; Lysaght et al., 2008, Figure 1). These characteristics
indicate that companies innovating in stem cell technologies would be among those the
literature finds to be most susceptible to SOX’s impact. The impression is reinforced by
reports from the US biotechnology industry body, the BIO, which has stated that “small
biotechnology companies have been suffocated by the onus of complying with the Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Act” (Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2006), that “[t]he biotechnology
industry was particularly hard-hit by the complex and burdensome regulations imposed
by SOX’s Section 404” (Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2007a), and that even after
implementation reforms SOX has a “lack of clear direction to auditors” in respect of small
company classification (Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2007b).
Our data on patents is from the US Patent and Trademark Office online database
at USPTO (2013). We use patent applications as our measure of patents rather than
granted patents because there is a delay between application and issuance while the patent
examiner assesses whether the application meets the criteria for granting a patent. The
date of application thus better measures the time at which the decision to commercialise
was made. The USPTO records both the date of application and the date at which the
application information was published on their database which is later than the date of
application. Thus, some recent patent applications are omitted from the database, with
more recent times having a smaller proportion of their applications recorded. To avoid
the risk of a fall in applications due to delayed coding interfering with our attempts to
identify changes in applications due to other factors, we identify patent applications with
the date at which their information was recorded on the database. This date is a noisy
and lagged measure of the application date. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the
distribution of times between filing and publication for stem cell technology applications
published in 2003. Half of all patent application filings are published within 39 weeks, and
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three quarters are published in just over a year. Some publications take place shortly after
application, so that an event affecting the decision to apply for patents should be reflected
in changes in applications at contemporaneous publication dates with a near complete
effect over the following two years.
Table 1: Summary statistics for the number of weeks between filing and publication of stem cell technology
applications published in 2003
Percentile
Statistic Mean St.dev 50 75 90 95
Weeks 50 33 39 58 80 91
The USPTO database publishes applications only after March 1, 2001, with applicants
after this date able to choose whether they wish to allow publication. Prior applications
may not have been offered this choice, so would by default be deemed secret. Thus, most
patent applications eligible for publication at much later dates would be made by applicants
who could choose, whereas many patent applications eligible for publication at early dates
may not have been published because the choice was not offered. This effect would be
expected to lower the initial publication rate relative to later rates. Table 1 suggests that
the effect will have substantially diminished by the middle of 2002 and all but vanished
a year later. Its presence and timing complicates the interpretation of any change in the
patent series as being due to SOX. We try to separate the two causes in section 5.2 by
seeing whether the patenting of non-US applicants differed from that of US applicants,
as both were subject to the USPTO regulations but generally only US applicants were
subject to SOX.
Figure 1: Published patent applications by month for US residents
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We used the USPTO online search facilities to identify patents with the exact phrase
“stem cell” or “stem cells” in their title. The search was for published applications split
by the month of publication for US resident applicants. Thus the code looked like
TTL/(“stem cell” OR “stem cells”) and PD/4/1/2001->4/31/2001 and ICN/(“US”).
The data covered the period from April 2001 to August 2009. 982 patent applications
by US residents were published in the period. Figure 1 shows publications of patent
applications by US residents. The rate of publications increases rapidly until around the
middle of 2003, then steadies until around 2005 when it steps up to a new plateau. The
plateau lasts until around 2007 when a new period of accelerating publication begins,
lasting until the middle of 2009.
An alternative to searching by individual patents is to look for patent classes mentioning
stem cell technology within their patent schedule or definition, and then count the number
of patents within them. There are six such classes, listed in table 2. The classes do not
exactly coincide with all stem cell patents, so patents not relating to stem cells are included
and some stem cell patents may lie outside the classes. The classes can be narrowed down
to subclasses to mitigate the latter problem, but may worsen the former.
Table 2: US Patent and Trademark Office patent classes with “stem cell” or
“stem cells” in the description or schedule
Patent class Description
424 Drug, bio-affecting and body treating compositions
435 Chemistry: molecular biology and microbiology
530 Chemistry: natural resins or derivatives; peptides or pro-
teins; lignins or reaction products thereof
800 Multicellular living organisms and unmodified parts thereof
and related processes
977 Nanotechnology
Generated by website searches on
http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/ for “stem cell” and for
“stem cells”.
4 Empirical method
We present first the equations we will use in empirical estimation. They allow for the
previous theoretical prediction of discontinuities in the patent process, through an au-
toregressive innovation metric combined with a current research input subject to breaks.
We introduce two null hypotheses on the distribution of breaks in the patent process for
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testing an exceptional change around the time of SOX, and identify any changes with time-
varying p-value and hidden Markov model estimations. Evidence for our earlier hypothesis
can then be provided by finding downward shifts in patenting around the time of SOX’s
introduction, and subsequent correction towards the initial level within a few years. We
can then infer SOX’s net effects by comparing patenting after the correction and before
SOX. Finally, we exclude a number of major potential alternative causes of the observed
behaviour other than SOX.
Our base specification has published patent applications Pt at time t following a random
process with conditional expected value at any time dependent on a numerical measure
of investment conditions It at time t, exogenous research Rt until time t, and the history
Ht = {Pt−1, Pt−2, Pt−3, . . . } of past patent rates until time t. Expected patents are a free
combination of a proportion of patents in each previous period and exogenous research. The
specific form of conditional expected patent numbers is multiplicative and exponential in
lagged patents and exogenous research. The multiplicative metric for innovation has been
analysed in Blundell et al. (1995). The exponents depend on innovation activity, which
itself depends on investment conditions. Given investment conditions, the exponents are
constant and the consequent growth in patents captures both market entry by potential
innovators and their innovation activity. Exogenous research grows at an exponential rate.
Thus we have
E(Pt|It, Rt, Ht) = A(It)(egt)B(It)
∞∏
i=1
P
ci(It)
t−i
where g is a constant, and A, B, and ci are functions.
Some of new potentially patentable innovations will have been anticipated by previous
patents, and others will have been subject to accelerated approval by the patent office.
These two effects are captured by dividing the expected patent numbers by fractional
powers of lagged patents. The form of the equation is therefore unchanged. The exponents
may be negative as well as positive.
Changes in investment conditions are represented by changes in the equation’s coeffi-
cients. Given the analysis in section 2, conditions are variable at the time of the introduc-
tion of legislation and during the period of investors’ learning about its effects.
Our first empirical specification has a single shock occurring over the period. We assume
that the exponents on the lagged patents are constant before and after the shock, while
allowing the drift and level to change. The testable equation is
E(Pt|It, Rt, Ht) = exp(a + bt + d1DSt>u + d2DTt>u)
∞∏
i=1
P cit−i
where DSt>u is a unit shift equal to one for times t > u and zero otherwise, and DTt>u
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is a trend change defined by DTt>u = t − u for times t > u and zero otherwise. The
stochastic distribution is taken to be negative binomial, and the estimation is by maximum
likelihood. As logarithms are taken when calculating the negative binomial likelihoods
under a multiplicative specification, we add one to all patent numbers before estimation.
The number of lags was determined by estimating the equation with up to twenty four
lags. The Akaike Information Criteria and the coefficient significance of the highest lagged
term were used to determine the optimal number of lags. The results are shown in the
appendix. Four lags were taken as optimal.
If shocks to the patent process are persistent, the accumulating error may be collinear
with a change in the time trend and estimator distributions may be different from their
non-persistent versions (see Hamilton (1994, pages 497-501) for derivations with normally
distributed errors). Persistent shocks may be misidentified as a break in the series. We
tested for persistency in expected patent rates using a Zivot-Andrews test on the logarith-
mic series, which tests for unit roots when there may be a trend change or unit shift in the
series. The statistic was -5.42, which is significant at five percent against a null hypothesis
of a unit root.
We estimate the equation repeatedly with the value of u varying across the period under
consideration. Estimations are not made for the first and last six months. Estimation is
undertaken for the equation with a unit shift alone, a trend change alone, and both break
types.
The procedure produces a series of p-values associated with an asymptotically valid
normal test that the break variables are individually or dually equal to zero at each date.
The p-values over the eighteen month period from July 2002 to December 2003 are directly
compared to find the minimal one, and the parameter estimates at the corresponding break
date calculated. The validity of the direct comparison relies on the assumption that our
prior information is that a patenting incentive shock is equally likely to occur at any point
in the period, implying a rising probability of incentive shock conditional on no shocks
prior to the considered date.
The p-values may not accurately reflect the probability of a break in the generating
process because of parameter biases in the finite sample maximum likelihood estimations.
Moreover, as estimates of the probability that the patent process has a significant break
during the eighteen month period, they do not allow for our search procedure. We want
the probability of no break at the date conditional on that date having the greatest uncon-
ditional evidence of a break in the period, rather than the unconditional probability of no
break at the date. To correct for MLE bias and allow for conditionality, we estimate the
patent process without breaks and use the estimated parameters to generate a thousand
Monte Carlo simulations of the process. For every simulation, we test for each type of
break over the period and record the minimal p-values. The frequency of the simulated
p-values lying below the actual data p-value is taken as an adjusted p-value for the break.
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Our second empirical specification considers multiple shocks over the period, with pos-
sibly repeated entry, exit, and return to a fixed number of patenting incentive states.
The incentive states have expected patent numbers with the autoregressive coefficients
constrained to zero, that is,
E(Pt|It, Rt, Ht) = Aj(t)ebj(t)t
where Aj(t) and bj(t) are the coefficients in state j(t), the state prevailing at time t. The
coefficients are specific to each state and do not have any relation to each other across
states. The stochastic distribution of the patents is Poisson in each state. When in one
state, the probabilities of moving to the same or another state in the following time period
depend only on the current state, not the transition history or the date. These assumptions
define a Poisson hidden Markov model (Zucchini and MacDonald, 2009).
We estimate the parameters in the second specification by maximum likelihood estima-
tion. The most likely sequence of states is also estimated by maximum likelihood using
the Viterbi algorithm. The algorithm calculates the most likely sequences of increasing
lengths, given the estimation transition matrix and observed data, and ending in each
possible state, using the Markov property to increment the length. For the sequences ex-
tending over the whole period, the maximum likelihood sequence is found by inspection
of the likelihood of the sequences for each end state. Zucchini and MacDonald (2009)
describe the mathematics of the algorithm and give a computer code implementation.
We estimate the model for two and three states. The first state in any estimation
is liable to capture the transition stage at the USPTO between obligatory and optional
secrecy in patent applications, when reported patents are limited. It may also be applicable
to describe later low levels of patenting, so it can serve a purpose in describing patenting
after the transition process has ended. We also estimated a four state model, which
potentially would be suitable to describe the transition stage, then a pre-SOX patenting
rate, then an immediate post-SOX rate, and finally a long term stage. However, on our
main data the likelihood maximising four state HMM used only three states, and so the
estimates are included within our three state results.
For a sequence of n periods, the number of state sequences is 2n or 3n. The most likely
path differs little from many other paths, and its individual probability may be low. The
estimates may be influenced by convergence thresholds even if they are small. There are
plausibly multiple local maxima that may be identified by maximum likelihood. In order
to ensure that the estimated sequence reflects a global maxima and its broad shape has
a high concentration of probability among potential sequences, we repeat the estimation
for multiple starting values for the Poisson rates in each state, selected either by visual
inspection of plausible values or as starting, average, and end values of second or third
quantiles of the data. The results we present are representative of the shape and timing
of the shifts between states across most estimations.
14
The estimation was performed in the R computer language (R Development Core Team,
2009) using the library packages Hmisc, urca, and MASS for the p-value estimation and
testing, and the msm package for the HMM estimation. All R code for the modelling is
available at the author’s website1, together with base data and simulated p-values.
5 Results
5.1 US residents’ patent applications
Figure 2: P-values for breaks in US residents’ applications by date. The solid line shows values for dual
breaks, the dashed line for unit shifts, and the dotted line for trend changes.
Figure 2 shows the p-values for unit, trend, and dual breaks (that is, breaks in either
the unit or trend component) at dates throughout the period 2001 to 2009 for published
patent applications by US residents. The solid line indicates values for dual breaks, the
dashed line for unit shifts, and the dotted line for trend changes. The unit shifts are most
likely to have occurred around the start of 2002, followed by the middle of 2003. The trend
changes are most likely to have occurred in the middle of 2002. Changes elsewhere are
unlikely. After allowing for correlations between the breaks, the dual break curve finds
strongest evidence for a break occurring at dates from around the middle of 2002 to the
last half of 2003. The strongest evidence occurs around the second quarter of 2003.
Table 3 shows the coefficient estimates for each break date. The coefficients are eval-
uated at the minimal p-value from July 2002 to December 2003. The unit shift is most
significant at July 2003, where it has a negative coefficient. It is significant at ten percent,
1http://ebasic.easily.co.uk/02E044/05304E/sox effect on innovation.html
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Table 3: Coefficient estimates for breaks at the time of the
minimum p-value in July 2002 to December 2003 inclusive
1 2 3
Unit shift -0.198 * -0.643 ***
0.116 0.176
Trend change -0.115 ** -0.059 ***
0.047 0.018
Time 0.006 *** 0.12 ** 0.068 ***
0.002 0.048 0.019
Constant 1.125 *** 0.038 0.74 ***
0.205 0.497 0.245
Dependent(t-1) 0.285 *** 0.238 ** 0.208 **
0.099 0.101 0.101
Dependent(t-2) 0.008 -0.067 -0.069
0.1 0.104 0.102
Dependent(t-3) 0.269 *** 0.186 * 0.156
0.099 0.104 0.104
Dependent(t-4) -0.095 -0.209 ** -0.218 **
0.092 0.099 0.099
Break significance 0.087 0.015 0.001
Adjusted significance 0.522 0.084 0.017
Pseudo R2 0.52 0.54 0.58
Box-Ljung p-value 0.98 0.9 0.89
Break date Jul-03 Jul-02 Jul-03
Standard deviations are shown below the coefficients. ***
denotes an unconditional p-value of less than 0.01, ** of less
than 0.05, * of less than 0.1. Time is measured in number of
months elapsed since March 2001.
but the adjusted p-value shows the coefficient has no significance. The minimal trend p-
value is at July 2002, where the change is negative. The change is equivalent to an eleven
percent reduction in expected patents compounded over time. It has an adjusted signif-
icance of eight percent. With both breaks included, the minimal p-value occurs in July
2003. The unit shift coefficient has a negative sign, marking a one-off reduction of 47 per-
cent in the expected rate of patenting, while the trend change is also negative, equivalent
to a six percent compounded reduction in the patenting rate. The adjusted probability
that the coefficients are simultaneously zero is two percent.
The top panel of figure 3 shows the decoded states of a two state hidden Markov model
applied to the patent data. There are two temporally connected states identified. The
first runs for seven months from April to October 2001 and has low and roughly constant
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Figure 3: Decoded states for a two state hidden Markov model (top) and three state HMM (bottom) for
US residents’ published patent applications; states are connected by coloured lines.
patenting rates. The second runs unbroken from November 2001 onwards and has an
apparently increasing patent rate. The bottom panel of figure 3 shows the decoded states
for a three state HMM process. The early connected state to October 2001 is unchanged.
A second state from November 2001 persists until April 2002, and then returns for a
connected two year period from July 2003 to June 2005. The second state’s sequence is
interrupted by a third state which lasts unbroken until the second state is restored in July
2003. After exit from the second state in June 2005, the third state returns and persists
until the end of the period. The third state has a higher apparent patenting rate than the
second state after transition. It is not clear whether the time trend is higher or lower.
Table 4 contains the maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients in each Poisson
patenting state, showing the constant and time trend components of the expectation. The
short-lived first state has a low rate throughout its duration under both the two state
and three state specifications. The second state has a far higher constant component to
the state expectation. For the three state estimation, the last state has a higher constant
component but lower trend than the second state.
The observations indicate a large upwards shift in the patenting rate and trend in
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Table 4: Coefficient estimates for the states in the two and
three state HMMs on US residents’ applications
1 2
State 1
Constant 0.209 1.004
Trend -0.234 0.141
State 2
Constant 9.819 *** 8.616 ***
Trend 0.088 *** 0.135 *
State 3
Constant 11.194 ***
Trend 0.062
Date of first entry into state 1 Apr-01 Apr-01
Date of first entry into state 2 Nov-01 Nov-01
Date of first entry into state 3 May-02
*** denotes an unconditional p-value of less than 0.01,
** of less than 0.05, * of less than 0.1. The p-values are
for an asymptotically valid chi-squared test using paramet-
rically bootstrapped standard deviations with 100 boot-
straps. Time is measured in number of months elapsed
since March 2001 multiplied by 0.1.
November 2001 away from the negligible patenting activity that existed until then. A
further upwards shift in level, if not in trend, occurred in May 2002. The patenting state
that emerged was interrupted temporarily from July 2003 to June 2005 by the restoration
of the previous state. The timing of the July 2003 break is consistent with an adverse
effect due to SOX. We thus find evidence in support of the patenting reduction after SOX
described in hypothesis one from both the break p-values and from the three state HMM
model. There is additionally evidence from the HMM model of a patenting correction at
a timescale consistent with hypothesis one, and that SOX has no persistent net effect.
5.2 US and non-US resident patenters
A number of explanations arise from factors affecting the patenting of both US and non-US
residents. Among them are an exhaustion of commercialisable ideas in stem cell technolo-
gies, a shift of global investor preferences against funding its innovation, a shift against
speculative investment generally, a reduction in US demand for stem cell technologies, pro-
cessing delays at the US patent office, or an increasing proportion of applicants choosing
to publish their applications over time.
Under this class of explanations, the incentives or ability of non-US residents to patent
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Figure 4: Published patent applications by month for non-US residents
in stem cell technologies is reduced at the same time as those of US residents. A break
in non-US residents’ published patent applications is likely to occur and approximately
coincide with the previously observed breaks. The earlier empirical equations form the
basis for testable hypotheses on a break in their published patent applications.
The data for non-US residents is also from the US Patent and Trademark Office. It is
shown in figure 4. The publication rate rises until around the start of 2003, then stabilises
until the end of 2004 when it begins to increase rapidly, lasting until the middle of 2006. It
undergoes a possible downwards shift in the level of the series. It then rises, falls, and then
rises again until the middle of 2009. The observed pattern is not clear; it could alternatively
be explained as a roughly constant growth rate with a period of greater volatility around
the end of 2005 and start of 2006.
Figure 5 shows the p-values for unit shifts (dashed line), trend changes (dotted line),
and dual breaks (solid line), estimated with an autoregressive lag of two. Unit shifts are
most likely at the end of 2004, and in the second halves of 2006 and 2007. The period
from the middle of 2002 to the end of 2003 has relatively less evidence of a break. Trend
changes are most likely to have occurred in 2005. The most probable times for a break in
at least one of the series are at the ends of 2004 and 2005, and the middle of 2006. The
SOX period is relatively less likely to have experienced a break.
The results contrast with the observed decline in the US residents’ patent rate at the
time of SOX. The two results are consistent with the decline’s cause acting only on US
residents. They provide evidence against the class of alternative explanations to SOX that
explain the decline in terms of globally effective factors.
The decoded states for a two state hidden Markov model of the non-US patent data are
in the top panel of figure 6. The initial state lasts from April 2001 to January 2002. From
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Figure 5: P-values for breaks in non-US residents’ applications by date. The solid line shows values for
dual breaks, the dashed line for unit shifts, and the dotted line for trend changes.
February 2002 it undergoes an extended break and is restored only in September 2007. It
then endures to the end of the period. The intervening second state lasts unbroken for
over five and a half years. It has an apparently higher level than the first state. They both
have an upward trend. In the three state model shown in the bottom panel, the first state
is unchanged from the two state model. The second state only occurs for the period from
February 2002 to November 2004. It has a higher apparent rate than the first state. After
its end until the restoration of the first state, a third state occurs with apparently even
higher rate and uncertain trend.
We do not see any evidence of a downward break in the period around SOX, or any
break at all. The analysis produces a similar conclusion to the p-values break results. It
is less likely that globally applicable factors were the main cause for the reduction in US
residents’ patent rates, and more likely that SOX was.
5.3 Institutional and non-institutional patenters
SOX only applies to publicly traded companies. If it was responsible for the break and
subsequent correction found in the US resident patent series, and if patent sources other
than public companies were insulated from its impact, we would not expect to see similar
behaviour in their series. In this section, we examine patenting by institutions including
government and universities. 2
US patents record the name of the inventor or inventors and the legal assignee of the
patent if they differ. When separately specified in our data, the legal assignee is generally
2Thanks to Pelin Demirel for suggesting comparison of institutional patenting and exclusion of technology specific be-
haviour.
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Figure 6: Decoded states for a two state hidden Markov model (top) and three state HMM (bottom) for
non-US residents’ published patent applications; states are connected by coloured lines.
an institution or company. We record the assignee for all US residents’ patent applications
over 1986-92. Of the 982 applications, 408 include an assignee. There are 237 assignees
with the highest number of patents due to a single assignee being 22. The assignees
are then separated into two groups of institutional and non-institutional patenters. The
criteria for inclusion in the former group is that they are a university, the US Government,
a hospital or group of hospitals, a medical centre, a foundation, or an institute. There is
also a single patent assigned to a person that we include in the institutional group on the
grounds that they too would not be directly affected by SOX. The other named assignees
are all corporate (both private and public) and are put into the non-institutional group.
There are 211 institutional patents and 197 non-institutional patents.
Some of the organisations in the institutional patenter groups operated through in-
corporated vehicles, and may potentially have been subject to SOX if they were public
companies. We assume that this possibility did not apply to many of the organisations
and so did not distort the exposure. The assumption is reasonable as the institutional
patents were largely from universities (155) rather than non-universities (56).
After data processing, we estimated the state sequences in three state hidden Markov
models on the institutional and non-institutional patent series. The results are shown in
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Figure 7: Decoded states for a three state hidden Markov model for US residents’ published patent
applications from institutions (top) and non-institutions (bottom); states are connected by coloured lines.
figure 7. As previously, patent numbers are collected into states and connected by coloured
lines.
The estimated states for institutional patenters are shown in the top panel. Only two
states are identified. The first consists of a seven month period from April to October 2001
when there were no patents and the reported patent applications are affected by the change
in patent secrecy described in section 3. From the end of 2001 onwards a single state is
identified to describe the general trend upwards in patenting. No third state required, and
so there is no change in the generating state around the time of SOX. Visually, there is
possibly a slight drop in patenting in the second half of 2003, but state sequences with
a state change are less likely than the single state sequence determined. It is possible
that the slight drop may be due to a SOX spillover from public companies, for example if
institutions patent anticipating licensing or intellectual property sales to public companies.
In the lower panel, we see the estimated states for non-institutional patenters. There
is an initial temporally connected state of low patenting that runs to January 2003. Then
there a short-lasting state for three months which contains the highest spike in patent
numbers over the whole 2001-9 period. Then follows the final state that is initially lower
than the previous state but rises over time. While the transition times are consistent with
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a SOX effect, the state switching differs from the 3 − 2 − 3 sequence observed for total
US originating patents. Moreover, the existence of the second state is determined by the
patent spike in March 2003. When we set the patent value in the month to zero, we obtain
almost the same state sequence as for institutional patents with two states transitioning
once in January 2002.
Caution is due in interpreting the state sequences because the number of patents in any
month is small, particularly early in the period. Caution taken, we can still note it is the
presence of patents without assignees that determines the behaviour of total US originating
patents, with the post-SOX fall and rise. It is possible that the non-assigned patents
are speculative work that organisations find it efficient to allow their workers to pursue
independently, and after SOX major companies are taking less risk and concentrating on
core work. We investigate further in section 5.5.
5.4 Exhaustion of ideas in the US
A further explanation for the observed break is based on the pattern of emergence and
exhaustion of patentable ideas. Ideas are posited to lead to patents. Ideas start slowly at
first as a technological idea is first investigated, then as the most promising prospects are
discovered the generation of patentable ideas accelerates, and finally the prospects begin
to be exhausted and the rate flattens. The observed break corresponds to the beginning
of the gradual exhaustion and deceleration.
In order to distinguish this explanation from the general global explanations just dis-
cussed, we have to posit that the decline is in the US alone. The situation might arise if US
innovators are innovating in a different type of patents than foreign innovators, for example
if they are far more technologically advanced. The condition requires that technological
innovation does not rapidly spill across borders, which is open to theoretical and empirical
question.
The explanation suggests a trend change in the patenting rate without a level shift in
it. The time-varying p-value analysis earlier found evidence for a trend change but no
significant evidence of a unit shift. The hidden Markov model estimation by comparison
found that there was a temporary downwards level shift in the aftermath of SOX. Thus,
the evidence available so far provides mixed evidence against the exhaustion hypothesis.
We investigate further by examining behaviour after the downturn. Under the exhaus-
tion hypothesis, the rate of innovation will decline further after the initial transition. We
test empirically for the presence of further downturn by modifying the form of expected
patents to
E(Pt|It, Rt, Ht) = exp(a + bt + et2 + d2DTt>u)
∞∏
i=1
P cit−i
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where the period assessed is from August 2003 to August 2009. Our first specification has
the restriction e = 0 with u set at the mid point between the break date and the end of
the period, ie August 2006 (so allowing for a late break). Our second specification has
d2 = 0 (allowing for a quadratic downturn in time with linear time as a covariate), and
our third has b = 0 and d2 = 0 (allowing for a quadratic downturn in time without a linear
covariate).
Table 5 shows the sign and significance of the late trend change and quadratic terms
in the maximum likelihood estimations. The sign on the late trend change is negative,
but the coefficient has low statistical significance. The same is true for the quadratic time
term in the presence of a linear time trend. If quadratic time is present without a linear
time trend, it has a positive coefficient and is highly significant, probably capturing some
of the linear trend effect. In summary, we again find limited evidence for the exhaustion
hypothesis as it is presented here.
Table 5: Coefficient estimates for the states in the two and three state
HMMs on US residents’ applications
Variation from a linear process Sign, p-value of the non-linear term
Late trend change -, 0.63
Month2 (with covariate month) -, 0.55
Month2 only +, 0.00
5.5 The earlier market downturn and reduced patenting incentives
The observed change in the patenting process may alternatively be attributed to a down-
turn in market prospects. Under this hypothesis, there was a loss of confidence or funding
in the market, and many innovators exited the market. There is data presented in Lysaght
et al. (2008) showing a decline in the financial performance and size of the tissue engi-
neering market prior to SOX, although the stem cell sub-sector experienced employment
growth and was financially sheltered by its pre-commercial status.
After a market decline and financial rationing, if remaining financiers are reasonably
accurate at assessing financial prospects of innovations the residual funding should be al-
located to innovations offering better financial prospects than innovations funded prior to
the rationing. By contrast, SOX has been associated with reduction in corporate funding
for new, small, and high growth companies, who may be expected to produce innovations
with better than average, if risky, prospects. Thus, the SOX and market downturn ex-
planations for patent number changes have different implications for the prospects of the
remaining innovations relative to innovations prior to the downturn.
We may noisily measure the financial prospects of patents by the number of patents cit-
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ing them. The propositions and measure allow us to form a testable hypothesis associated
with the downturn conjecture, that the rate of citing of new patents was higher after the
process change than before it. The alternative hypothesis associated with a SOX effect is
that the rate of citing was the same or lower after the process change.
Table 6: Rate of citing of patents whose applications were filed April 2001
to March 2002 or April 2003 to March 2004 inclusive, split by issue year
Applications filed in 2001/2 Applications filed in 2003/4
Issue year Counts Average citations Counts Average citations
2002 1 1
2003 5 4.8
2004 15 5.3
2005 15 2.5 1 0
2006 17 1.3 5 0.6
2007 6 2.2 5 1.2
2008 3 1 12 0.2
2009 5 0 9 0.1
2010 1 0 8 0
Total 68 2.6 40 0.3
Data is from the US Patent and Trademark Office. The website
search term was, for example, TTL/(“stem cell” OR “stem cells”) and
APD/4/1/2001->3/31/2002 and ISD/4/1/2006->3/31/2007.
Table 6 shows the citation rates for stem cell technology patents whose applications
were filed from April 2001 to March 2002 inclusive, compared with those filed between
April 2003 and March 2004. Data is from USPTO (2013). The rates are given for all
citing patents up to July 2010, and are split by the year of patent issue and for all issue
years combined. The combined citation rate is far higher for the earlier period of filing.
The higher combined rate may be possibly attributable to a longer post-issue period for
earlier filed patents and hence more exposure and opportunities for citation. The length
of the period since issue is controlled by the comparison of patents issued in the same
year. These rates are consistently higher for the patents filed in 2001 to 2002. We find no
evidence of an increase in the citation rate for patents filed after the observed break, or
that financial prospects as proxied by citation rates picked up after it. The result weakens
support for the hypothesis that a financial downturn was the main driver of the observed
changes in the patent process.
5.6 US Government funding cuts for human embryonic stem cell research
A further candidate explanation for the observed change in the patenting process is that
legislative or federal funding activity relating to human embryonic stem cell technologies
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in the United States affected the rate of patent applications. In 2001, the US administra-
tion restricted federal funding for research in human embryonic stem cells (United States
White House, 2001). The decision may have driven down innovation in human embryonic
stem cell technologies directly, and indirectly affected companies producing other stem cell
technologies (see Salter (2005, page 8) for a description of a contamination effect between
the two forms of technology).
Figure 8: Published patent applications in human embryonic stem cells technologies by month for US
residents
The mechanism is feasible, but it seems implausible that it would have a sufficiently large
effect to be the only cause of the observed process change. Firstly, federal research funding
was restricted on stem cell lines from embryos destroyed after the date of the restriction,
but not prior to the date. Thus, the restriction was partial. Secondly, it did not affect
privately funded research. Thirdly, the number of human embryonic stem cell patents was
very small compared with the number of general stem cell patents. From a search on the
US Patent and Trademark Office database, the cumulative number of US residents’ patent
applications between April 2001 and August 2003 with “human embryonic stem cell” or
“human embryonic stem cells” in the title was just ten compared with 185 general stem
cell technology patents. Even if the federal funding restriction stopped most innovation in
human embryonic stem cell technology, the direct effect on the broader innovation group
would be very limited. Fourthly, if there is a contamination effect on non-embryonic
innovation from the restriction, it would have to be very large and persistent to account
for the observed process change. There seems little prior reason to believe in such an
effect. Fifthly and finally, insofar as it is possible to determine a process shift from the low
numbers of human embryonic patents in figure 8, it does not seem to be any greater than
that affecting the general stem cell patent series.
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5.7 Breaks in other patent series
If SOX explains the changes in the US stem cell patenting series, then similar changes
should be observed in the series of other new and risky technologies. We briefly test for
them in this section. New data is extracted from the US Patent and Trademark Office
online database, modifying the search criteria to
TTL/(“product” OR “products”) and PD/4/1/2001->4/31/2001 and ICN/(“US”).
where “product” is a product or product characteristic. We select a handful of terms
from SIC codes to give a variety of technology characteristics. Thus, “product” is set to be
“furniture”, “telecommunication”, “computer”, and “medical”. Considering the length of
time and stability of the products’ respective markets, the size of innovative companies in
them, and the chance of product failure, we may guess that the list is in increasing order
of response to SOX.
Figure 9 shows the results of running a three state HMM on each of the resulting product
series. The top panel shows the estimated states for furniture patents. There is an initial
period of low patenting, when the secrecy policy of the USPTO was adjusting. There is
subsequently a higher single state from the middle of 2002 until April 2009, when the low
initial state returns.
Estimated states for telecommunication patents are in the second panel. There is an
initial state characterised by low but quickly increasing patents. Then a single state contin-
ues until August 2009, with the exception of a single month in 2006 which has a patenting
rate much higher than in other months and so returns to the initial state with its patents
extrapolated. Visual inspection indicates a possible downward trend in patents from the
middle of 2002 to the end of 2003 with a recovery over the following year, but maximum
likelihood doesn’t indicate that it should be represented through a different state.
The third panel displays the estimated states for computer patents. There is an early
state with low and rapidly rising patent numbers. From the middle of 2001 a higher level
but more slowly growing state emerges, which is broken in June 2002 by a third state at an
even higher level. The state persists until the summer of 2003, when the second lower state
returns and is dominant until the last part of 2004 and for much of the period after 2006.
The second state returns in 2005 and 2008. The interpretation of the state fluctuations is
not entirely clear, but the 2003-4 reduction and restoration is consistent with an effect due
to SOX.
In the bottom panel we see estimated states for medical patents. After a transient high
growth, low level state, a second state emerges that occurs uniquely from the final quarter
of 2001 to the middle of 2002. Then a higher third state emerges which persists until May
2003, when it begins a nine month oscillation with the lower state. From the middle of
2004, the higher state is dominant with occasional re-entries into the second state. The
second state returns to be the principal state from the middle of 2008.
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Figure 9: Decoded states for a three state hidden Markov model for US residents’ published patent appli-
cations mentioning furniture (top), telecommunication (second), computer (third), and medical (bottom);
states are connected by coloured lines.
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The behavioural response across all products has been broadly as expected. Depending
on the riskiness of the market, patenting falls at a time consistent with an effect due to
SOX, and is restored subsequently as is consistent with a decline in uncertainty about it.
The effect is absent for the lowest risk market and strongest for the highest risk market.
The results are as we expected, but strong cautions should be made. The selection of
products to examine is ad hoc, though motivated by diversity and without exclusion of
trialled product analyses. The classification of market risk is also informal and could be
challenged. For these reasons, this section should be considered an outrider for a more
formal and exhaustive selection, processing, and analysis.
6 Conclusion
We have presented and solved for the investment choice faced by investors in an innovative
company before SOX, immediately after it, and later when market uncertainty has reduced.
Our hypothesis was that a temporary downwards shift in innovation occurred after SOX,
and analysis of stem cell technology patents found supporting evidence. Our theoretical
analysis further suggested that SOX’s long-term effect depended on the relative sizes of
SOX costs and the risk premium associated with uncertainty about managerial quality.
Empirical analysis indicated that SOX had no long term effects on innovation in stem cell
technology. Thus, we agree with the literature emphasising transient uncertainty effects of
SOX (Akhigbe et al., 2008) and further find its long term neutrality.
The literature has indicated that managerial incentives changed after SOX (Cohen et al.,
2013). We did not model managerial incentives in our theoretical presentation. To an
extent, they could be captured within our model as managerial perceptions of uncertainty
due to SOX would also diminish over time. However, there would be a misalignment
between managerial and investor incentives and risks as managers would be able to observe
their own management quality prior to SOX and investors would not, and changes in
incentive alignment due to SOX could modelled more fully. For a full welfare analysis,
investor, manager, and consumer utility would have to be considered.
Our theoretical presentation suggested how innovation delays respond to SOX’s char-
acteristics. An optimal form of implementation could be calculated based on trade-offs
between speed of implementation, expected costs, and dispersion of costs. An implemen-
tation model could be estimated or calibrated to SOX data, and counterfactuals could
be investigated. A detailed dynamic programming model could give a more complete
method of exploration. Other disclosure regulations, that like SOX generate real options
for investors, could be used to get greater data breadth in estimation.
Various small departures from the empirical model’s assumptions were tested during
this paper’s preparation, being rejected as imperfect models of count data although they
may be more valid for other data sets. We tested additive instead of multiplicative patent
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forms and used random walk processes for patent emergence with sandwich and GARCH
errors. The conclusions were not altered.
Most analyses of SOX’s effects are based on panel data rather than a single time series.
We may extend the approach here to patent panel data, using multivariate count data and
HMM models which are established in the literature. The dummies that are used in the
SOX literature based on differences-in-differences may not enter these count data models
in additive form making their removal more complex, if possible at all. Thus, relative to
the existing literature it may be more difficult to isolate SOX breaks and separate SOX
effects from other effects, and the graphs presented here may not readily translate into a
panel data analysis for visual examination. There would also be the problem that series
breaks could occur at different times. Again, a dynamic programming model could be
conceivably used, or a cellular automata model.
We used publication date rather than application date when constructing the patent
time series, in order to ensure that late period values were not distorted by delayed publi-
cation of applications. As more time passes from the end of the period, we can have more
confidence that such distortions will not occur, so future studies could use application
dates. Preliminary examination of the US stem cell patent series with application dates
indicates that a temporary drop was observed after SOX, in line with the results above,
but it is less clear than with publication dates. A multi-series analysis may be required to
obtain statistical significance in changes.
Other future empirical work could examine SOX-related causes for the observed patent-
ing shifts in more detail, in order to determine whether the mechanism suggested here or
an alternative was responsible. For example, one alternative would be companies avoiding
patenting in order to avoid value creation and so remain below the threshold for accelerated
SOX filing (see Gao et al., 2009).
Our work suggests some policy implications, based on the restricted model we have
presented. Other things being equal, unnecessary uncertainty about the implementation
costs of a reform increases investment delays so should be avoided, for example by keeping
investors informed about the details of legislation, particularly in newer, smaller, and more
volatile industries. Unnecessary uncertainty may also be avoided by following a timely leg-
islative process. Holding other things equal, increased implementation costs increase delays
and lower long term innovation, while disclosure legislation increases long term innovation
only if its costs are below the investor’s risk premium associated with ignorance about the
non-disclosed information. We have neglected improvements in managerial behaviour that
may modify this conclusion and which could be examined separately or connected with
our study in future work. A more rapid implementation may increase investment delays
during the implementation period. These characteristics are unlikely to operate indepen-
dently, for example as faster implementation may be likely to bring increased costs and
uncertainty about the costs, so that a fuller model looking at trade-offs and counterfactual
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implementations would be valuable in policy discussions.
On a final policy note, our finding of no net long term effect of SOX on innovation does
not imply that Sarbanes Oxley had no impact. Our theoretical model suggested that the
net effect on innovative investment can be decomposed into SOX’s effects on costs and
on investor risk premiums linked to uncertainty about managerial quality. SOX may have
individually impacted on both of them so that the effects were equal and opposite. It is
therefore feasible that either costs or investor risk premiums could be reduced in order to
increase the net benefits of SOX, through measures such as the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act of 2012 (Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2012).
Appendix: Autoregressive diagnostics
Table A1: AIC and highest lag p-values by AR order
for negative binomial models of patent applications
US applicants Non-US applicants
Lag AIC Lag p-value AIC Lag p-value
1 424.6 0.09 375.1 0.05
2 426.6 0.9 374.4 0.1
3 427.5 0.31 376.2 0.61
4 426.7 0.08 378.1 0.83
5 428.6 0.77 379.9 0.67
6 430.3 0.62 381.9 0.98
7 432.1 0.66 382.6 0.24
8 432.6 0.21 382.2 0.13
9 434.3 0.63 383.6 0.44
10 436.3 0.95 384.5 0.28
11 437.4 0.33 386.4 0.73
12 438.9 0.49 387 0.24
13 436.6 0.04 388.3 0.42
14 434.5 0.05 390.3 0.93
15 435.8 0.38 384 0
16 434.5 0.07 386 0.96
17 436.5 0.94 386.5 0.23
18 434.7 0.05 386.8 0.19
19 435.7 0.32 388.5 0.62
20 437.4 0.58 389.2 0.25
21 438.5 0.34 391.1 0.76
22 437.9 0.1 393.1 0.93
23 438 0.17 394.8 0.57
24 433.3 0.13 390.8 0.17
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